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1NONDISTORTING AGRICULTURAL INCOME SUPPORT:
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE  DISCUSSION IN WEST GERMANY
1.  The Discussion on Nondistorting Income  Support and Decoupling
Agricultural market and price policies,  such as  the  Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) employed within the  EC, basically establish  a
system of  international and intersectoral  income  transfers.  These  income
transfers from  the nonfarm to  the  farm sector take many different  forms,
the most important of these  being indirect  transfers,  also  referred to  as
"invisible  transfers,"  since  consumers are  forced to pay higher than world
market contract prices  for agricultural products.
According to  this view, market and price policies could be  regarded as
a specific  type  of income policy.  Despite  the  fact that this  special
income  policy has been employed  for a long  time,  it hasn't  really succeeded
in solving the  original and persistent problem, which  is  the  removal or at
least  the alleviation of income  disparity between the  farm and the nonfarm
sector  (for a different  interpretation see,  Schmitt and Gebauer, 1987).
Today, even more  than in the past,  these policies  cause not only
enormous  output enhancing effects and high budget costs  for storage and
inferior use of surplus products, they also create  international  trade
distortions  and, to  an increasing  extent, environmental damages.
Consequently,  in  the  seventies a broad discussion started  on the
problem of reorganizing the  transfer of income  from the  nonfarm to  the  farm
sector.  The continuing debate  gave rise  to a wide variety of proposals
focusing on a switch  from price support policy to  direct income  transfer
programs.  These are viewed as  being able  to  dissolve  ("decouple")  the
connection between the  level  of price  support and further production
2incentives.  As  a result most of  the proposals  in  the  seventies intended  a
severe reduction of price support.  For  this reason most proposals  only
provide a basis for discussion and are  never considered to  be
alternatives to  the  present system.
Agricultural policy makers nowadays  rely increasingly on direct
payments  to  complement and supplement current price  support.  Because  the
demand for agricultural products  (at  least  in developed countries)
stagnates  and the supply  still  increases  (due to  technical progress and  the
level  of price support),  concepts  aimed at decoupling income  support from
price and production incentives  are increasingly attractive  to  farm policy
makers  (see also Runge  and Halbach,  1987,  p. 7).
As past experience  reveals,  a system of indirect  transfers  such  as  the
CAP  is  difficult  to manage and  is,  therefore,  less  efficient.  The present
system has frequently been criticized because of  its diminishing impact on
the  level of income  to  farm households  (Koester and Nuppenau, 1987).
Direct  income  transfer schemes--substituting the  present market and price
policies--might provide at  least the chance to  tackle  the most pressing
problems of overproduction,  low incomes,  international  trade distortions,
and environmental damages  in a more straightforward and successful manner.
These  (a priori) assessments largely correspond to  the  results of
comparisons between various  systems of  income support to  farm households
based on theoretical  considerations.  The direct income  transfer payment
system, without any  links  to current production, turns  out to be the  one
with the  largest welfare gains  and  increases in gross national product
(for details see Rodemer,  1980;  Wille,  1976).
3This paper, therefore,  focuses primarily on direct income  transfers  to
farm holdings/households starting with a classification and definition of
income  transfers in Section 2.  A description of the various  income
transfer programs currently employed in the  Federal Republic of Germany is
given in Section 3.  Section 4 describes the basic characteristics  of the
current schemes  that have been proposed by agricultural economists,
politicians  and/or official  institutions.  An assessment of these  concepts
is  attempted by referring to  the allocation of  resources,  the  distribution
of  income, budget costs,  etc.  Remarks on the  limits and principles of  a
system of direct  income transfer payments will conclude  the paper.
2.  Income Transfers:  Classification, Definition, and Objectives
In reviewing the  literature  on transfer payments  it  is  remarkable  that
very little work has been carried out concerning a systematic registration
and classification of income  transfers  to  farm households.  Following  the
diagnosis put forward in the  first section, that agricultural policy
nowadays reduces  to a specific type of  income policy, the need for and the
advantage of a categorization scheme of  income transfers becomes evident.
Figure 1 attempts  to present an overview of main sources and types  of
positive income  transfers favorable to farm households/farm holdings.
Negative income transfers,  e.g.,  personal taxes,  are not taken into
consideration in this paper.
Positive  income transfers are divided into direct  and
indirect transfers according to whether the recipient gets  the
income  transfer directly from public/private households or not.
Direct and  indirect transfers are  further divided into monetary
(explicit) and non-monetary  (implicit) transfers.  Tax
4exemptions,  for example, are positive, direct and  implicit  transfers
without any actual payments.
Figure 1.  Positive Income  Transfers  to  Farm Households/Holdings.
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Within the paper the  term direct  income transfers  refers  to
explicit  transfers provided by public budgetary funds,  for all  or a
specific group of agricultural holdings  or farm households, with or'without
any conditions or stipulations  concerning the use of the benefits, in order
to  improve  or  to maintain the  level of disposable/gross  income  of farm
households  (see Weinschenck,  1973;  Wille, 1976, p. 43).
As  seen in Figure 1, direct and explicit income  transfers  represent
only a small  fraction of all  income transfers.  Although direct transfers
are of  increasing importance,  indirect income  transfers and real transfers
account for  the bulk of the  total volume.  Neglecting  the so-called
"invisible" transfers via higher consumer prices,  the  total volume  of
income transfers,  for example, within the Federal Republic  of Germany,
amounts to  approximately 15.35  (11.26) billion German Mark  (DM) in 1982
(1973).  These  figures  roughly correspond to  DM 12,000  (6,400) per
5agricultural worker  (working unit) and DM 19,000  (10,100) per  farm holding
on average  in 1982  (1973)  (Thoenes, 1985, pp.  145-149).
Direct income transfers currently available to  farm
holdings/households result from two main sources:  (a) they are linked to
the  farm holding and represent subsidies,  for example,  for diesel fuel,  for
continuing to  farm in less-favored areas such as hills and mountain
regions,  for keeping beef cattle or sheep,  etc.,  or  (b) they are
deficiency-type payments to  compensate for  the  difference between market
and guaranteed level of prices to producers.  Another category covers
transfer payments which are available  to  farmers who  cease  (parts of)
agricultural production or  to young farmers who  start farming.  This
category of  transfer payments also includes  allowances  given to  small-sized
farmers  in order  to  lower the  financial burden of membership rates  to  the
social security system.  Generally, these transfers are more directly
linked to  the personal situation.  Nevertheless,  it  is  extremely difficult
to  establish a careful and meaningful differentiation according to whether
the farm holding or  the farm household represents  the original  transfer
unit.  In most cases entitlement  to  transfer payments links  criteria
related to both  the farm operator/household and the farm holding.
The literature on direct  income transfers provides a number of
classifications based on the valuation for calculating the  amount of
benefits and their adjustment.  Transfers linked to  the farm enterprise can
refer to  parts or to  total agricultural output, to  factor  input (land,
labor, capital, purchased inputs),  and to  farm profits  in the  current year
or during a base period.  Transfers paid according to  the volume of current
production, work like an increase  in marginal revenues for the  products  in
6question and cause  the  same effects  as  an  increase  in prices.  On the  other
hand, transfer payments related  to a base period do  not affect product or
factor specific marginal revenues;  these  are sometimes  called "production-
neutral  transfers."  Although they have no direct effect on production and
factor input decisions,  they might influence  the decisions on capital
investment and employment  (farm and nonfarm working decisions)  because of
an  increase  in  liquidity and the  level of disposable  income  (Henrichsmeyer,
et  al.,  1981, p. 22f).l  Transfer payments linked  to the  farm household
refer mostly to  total  income of  the household or of the  farm operator
(couple).  In  that case  they are  "income-tested" programs;  this category of
transfer  scheme could be  labeled personal  income  transfers.  Some authors
also use  this  term in case  the basis  for calculating  the amount of benefits
will not be adjusted or when it refers  to a base  period which  ignores
further changes  in total  output,  input or farm profits.
In referring to  the  objectives and policy implications  of transfer
schemes  some authors  distinguish among them according to  their
anticipated/proposed  impact on  the  level and distribution of income.  Some
transfer  schemes attempt a full compensation of  income losses,  others  just
guarantee a minimum level  of income or even attempt to  change the  income
distribution in favor of low income groups.
Irrespective of the  conceptual problems and the  terminology used by
different authors, any designation of  transfer programs should focus on the
specific design of the transfer  scheme.  Their allocative and
distributional impacts  depend mainly on these arrangements.  In addition,
any attempt to  reform price supports by introducing a "system" of direct
1See also Section 4.2.1.
7income  transfer payments  should also pay attention to  the  fact  that
indirect and direct  (explicit and implicit)  transfers have to be jointly
evaluated.  The whole system of  income  transfers must be examined in order
to have an adequate basis to  discuss consequences with respect  to  the
allocation of  resources and the  level  and distribution of  income.
3.  Selected Direct  Income Transfer Programs  Currently Applied in  the
Federal Republic of Germany
In the  Federal Republic of Germany direct income  transfers are
employed in various  fields.  The  transfer schemes currently implemented are
not based on  the  idea of creating a uniform system of direct income  support
for farm households;  in most cases  these  schemes reflect some ad hoc
adjustments  according to  actual political  constellations and particular
purposes.
The first broad experience with direct  income transfers  in the  Federal
Republic of Germany dates back to  1970-71.  Farmers received a
compensation for reducing the price  support level  for cereals after  the
German Mark was revaluated.  The  compensatory payments  given to  farmers
were digressive,  limited to four years and primarily linked to  the
agricultural area used.  The total  amount of benefits  spent  for  850,000
farm holdings summed up  to  302 million DM.
Some of the  transfer schemes currently applied  in the  Federal Republic
of Germany are co-financed by the Community Budget  (EAGGF-Guidance section)
for example, the transfer program for  the less-favored areas.  However,
the bulk of direct income  transfers  is  financed by the  Federal Budget and
the budgets  of the regional  governments--the  so-called Federal  "Laender."
8Recently almost all  Federal "Laender" have  established a wide variety
of programs  for environmental protection purposes;  they  intend to
compensate farmers  for reducing  the input of fertilizers  and/or pesticides
on certain areas of arable land, permanent pastures  and meadows.  The
amount of benefits paid varies between 100  to  600  DM per hectare  (the
average is  300-400 DM).2 These schemes  are not  included in Table  1.  For
this  reason, the  transfer schemes represented in Table  1 account for  only
a small fraction of the whole variety of programs  currently employed.
These  transfers are available  to  farmers  throughout  the  Federal Republic of
Germany, with the  exception of the  "Fallow-Scheme,"  a large scale
experiment  conducted in Lower  Saxony.  The schemes  listed in Table  1 were
selected because they have  some of  the basic characteristics  of  the
different  designs and arrangements of the  direct income  transfer programs.
Besides  these  schemes  there are a large number  of additional transfer
programs providing explicit or  implicit transfers,  for example,  a subsidy
on diesel  fuel  (647  million DM in 1986),  settlement benefits  for young
farmers  (22  million DM in 1986),  interest reductions within a "general  farm
credit scheme,"  increase of the VAT for agricultural products  to  compensate
for the removal of the positive monetary compensatory amount  (2.7 billion
DM in 1986),  and up  to  18.4 billion DM during the period of 1984  to  1991
(Agrarbericht,  1987, p. 64).
The transfer schemes  currently employed reveal no unique direction of
objectives.  On the  one hand, transfer schemes  provide support to  farmers
running small-sized farm holdings, on the other hand, they provide
numerous  incentives  to  give up  small-sized farming.  The various  schemes
2Quite a number of these programs are listed in ASG  (1986).
9remain particularistic,  and  there  is  no evidence of how to  solve  the
principal problem of the  CAP, which  is  to  reduce over-production by
accepting market realities.
Table  1.  Selected Income Transfer Schemes  Currently Applied  in  the  Federal
Republic of Germany
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4.  Direct Income Transfer Programs:  A Review of Proposed Schemes
4.1.  Characterization
The  transfer schemes reviewed in this section represent proposals put
forward by agricultural economists,  the  Federal Ministry  of Agriculture and
the  EC Commission.  They are very heterogeneous with respect  to  the
objectives,  the  fields of application, and  the  instrumental design.  Table
2 summarizes  and stresses  the main characteristics of  these proposals with
10the  aid of a synoptic presentation.  The  table  indicates  that several
schemes were proposed in the  seventies, most of  them referring to  the  farm
holding:  the basis of valuation being parts of,  or  total agricultural
output or  factor input.  Usually, these schemes were not income-tested,
that  is,  benefits were granted without taking total household  income  into
account.  Because  the calculation of transfers  refers  to  a base period, and
the  entitlement  to benefits  is  restricted to  farm operators running a farm
enterprise at the  time of a system change,  these  schemes were often labeled
personal  income  transfer  programs.
Income-tested transfer  schemes  (e.g.,  SSR-1-2),  on  the  other hand, are
designed to  supplement the present  system of price support  (with the
exception of  the MIG-scheme)  and to correct for  increasing intra-sectoral
income-disparities.
At present another group of direct income  transfer payments attracts  a
lot  of attention--set-aside  and fallow-schemes,  some  of them in
combination with retirement schemes, which are available  to  farmers  older
than 55  years  (SSR-3;  MRP-scheme).  These schemes have been proposed just
recently.  They reflect on the worsening situation of agricultural markets
and on dramatically increasing budget expenditures.  Participating farmers
are supposed to  close down agricultural production and to  put land to  set-
aside.  On the EC-level, however,  these schemes.do  not meet with general
approval.  Therefore,  it  is  likely that set-aside schemes and retirement
schemes, with no or minor stipulations on land use, will be  implemented
separately.
The  following sections discuss  some of the  implications  of the
programs listed in Tables 1 and 2:  the  allocation of resources,  the
11distribution of  income, budgetary aspects,  impacts on environmental
protection, and administrative problems.
4.2  Assessment
4.2.1  Allocative effects and structural adjustments
Level and  structure of agricultural output.  The  assessment of direct
income transfer payments  in relation to  level  and structure  (composition)
of agricultural output, must consider the  following points:  first,  the
reaction of total supply due  to  reduction of  the current price level  (price
elasticity of supply);  second, the changes  in  the structure  of total
agricultural supply.
Nearly all  types of  transfer schemes  listed  in Table  2 propose a
successive reduction of present price support.  Successive  price
reductions,  as  seen from the  recent experience within the  EEC,  cannot
retard further increases  in agricultural production.  The  effects of
gradual price reductions will be overcompensated by technical progress and
the high marginal productivity of yield increasing  inputs;  therefore,  they
are not qualified to  significantly reduce market imbalances  in the  short
run.  On the other hand, immediate and drastic price reductions, with or
without direct  transfer payments, cannot refer to  any historical and
empirical experience;  consequently, predictions concerning the  development
of total supply are very speculative.
Successive price reductions, supplemented by direct transfer payments
proportional  to  total output during an actual  or base period, as  in the  CP,
PIT and DCP Schemes, will not provide significant short-term effects  on
the  level of agricultural production.  In a study focusing on the milk
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duce  pricet
13Table  2.  (Continued)
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(sla  '/e)  (N1RS)  (ere(PfNT)  lural Reforml:  Income Aids  (MRP)
_  ,1,  ,_~___I(55)_(S___  R)
·* eiu  supplementation  of  substitution of the price sup-  supplementation of the  price  support  system
port  system
icts  -improvement of structural  - mprovement  o(  alricul-  u  market  relle;  mirlert  relief
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rnvironmentl  protection;  petition:  farm  em.plrment
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cli services.  protectlon  of
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' Urws  pe-ralretimerr  nt  benefit: use  compeusatorv  payments re  compensatory payments  c-  benefits iranted  to 55 -6
complenmrntry  of agricultural ares  for eco-  lted  to  aglrcultural  ire  cordin  to:  years  old farmer  for  clo. meanure  logical purposes; collecting  utilized;  :  common  guideliear  for  In  down  agricultural  pro. dreirvry quots (milk):  reduction  of prce  support  financial assistance;  duction  up  to  I  perod  of
('liberalied  markiet')  2:  guidelinie  for  linancial  10 yers.
assistince by member states;  meelures  to improuv the cutl
3:  retirement  scheme:  livaton of 'renwble renourcn
- :  set  lside of Farm  lnd  (en rly  cropI)
- b:  restructuring  of farm
lind
retrictiv  price policy (-  S
to  10% rrductions  in  real
terms); producer co-reson-
sibility  levy  relaxation  of
product Intvntion  and
price glurantea;
MDrea  the ta11  mtdl
-tW  non-income  tated  non-lncome  tested  1.2:  income-tested:  income-trted (non-frm  in-
3:  non-income tisted  come)
-bai  l  e(Irtl/  age of the  ferm  operator  agricultural we  utilied dur-  1.2:  total  income  of  the  agricultural  are  utilizd:
prrl  at  the  time of  introducing  ing a beSt  period;  frm  househod:
the rytern:  number of years  3:  aricultural  area utiliud;
prid  memberohip fees  age of the  form  operator
tifedir  tMI/  inceselment of retirement  211 ECU/hctare  of  agri  I: annual  payment(S yersm: beic payment:  retirment
fkn  brbenefiu  (pension  celims)  by  ctu  *ra  ttl  ar  utilized (1979)  dgreslrve)  benefits +  membersnhp  Irt
one third (1l9ti:  max.  OM  if grM poduction  lowe  2:  to social security system (198l
11  16 per  month:  Sl yrn  hy  I2%  del  to  the  reduc-  la: bail benefit:  3000  ECU  OM  12500); additional bene-
old  form  operator);  tiw  df  u wpprt;  (annual  benefit  paid up to  fit is  proportional  to  total
ceritaon  of  farming  doer  pem  s  iMl  be calculated  10 years or  up  to  70  years  area  of agriculturl land ut
not  offet pensone  claim:  wif  do  on  the  diftr-  of lifer benefits per  hectare:  aide  (and  productivity of
application  not bnindin;  nm  beten the value  of  250  ECU(30  ECU(  for  af-  land):  OM  200  -600  per
tal  erxemption  in  cae  of  grew  production  and  the  forteted  aret):  hectare:  no bnmeft  cnling
cloe-down:  toat  cos  of  production  3b:  bis benefit:  3000  ECU  no.frarm income eceeding
referrin  to specialied arabl  (age  of  the  form operator  the benc  um rtwice w11  re-
formm (1000  5000 frms  lest  then  60);  (2500  ECU  ducetrantfer  paymnt: non-
rrthin the EEC);  the amount  for farm operton older thin  gricultural  ue of alret  et
of I  ftsi will be corrected  60)  aside is allowed  nd will not
to  ccount  for  I  difTfern-  offset  benefit  claim;  add.
litt rent (eompenation for  benefits for  bandoning  milk
farm in  les  favoured  ar-  production according to  de-
er)  livrry  quota;
·*  deMi  unlimited  (30  year)  unlimited  1:  years  IS  year
3:  10 years  (period  of  appliction:  5
yers)
· il  frm operorator  all  farm  I:  full-time  farmers.  total  55 - 65 y)rs old  farmers;
peronable  ge: 58 -65:;  ncome per working unit lrs  definitively csction of farm-
right  to  opt  for  the  pn-  than  125%  of Iverage  re-  ing  up  to  10 year;  milk
iaen: 35  65  years  of life:  lionel incomel  lev  r  It  ddivry  quota  are  collected;
than  100%  of averrge  na-
tional  income; 'vability'  af-
ter  S yeas;
2:  total  income  oer  work-
ing unit  Ins  then  l00% of
averige regional income(90%
of averirt  national income);
3  fulltime farmers  and hired
ferm-workers older thin 55
yers:  celsation of forming;
use of agricultural  area:  a)
non-laricultural purpotes  (fal-
low:  rfforeting);  b) rtstruc-
luring  (lend  leased  to  'vi
able'  frm  holdinsl;)
*C$NIOm  posibly: stipulations  on lInd  maintennce  of  st  aside
use (se  aside.  flloew.  eco-  real
logical usesn)
·- adailtal  ocial  security  dadminstr  pe  o  application:  EEC  EEC.  member  state  social  security  dminstre-
tion  tlin
- _l  g  federal budget,  memberrhl  p  tax  1: EAGGF  co-finenced;  Fedlorl budgt: co-financing
contribution  2:  member  states
3: EAGGF  co-financed
14market, Hanf and Koester  (1980, p. 120)  ascertain that a reduction of  the
producer price of milk by about 20 percent is  necessary to  definitively
stop further  increases of the  quantity of milk produced.
Short-term market relief on sub-markets,  such as milk and cereals,
could be attained by employing set-aside or cessation-schemes and  fallow
programs.  However, when participation  is  voluntary, and there are no  (or
minor) stipulations concerning  the size  and the  use of the  enrolled area,
as  intended by the proposals of  the EC Commission (Agra Europe,  1988)  and
the set-aside programs employed in the United States  of America  (see
Boeckenhoff, et  al.,  1985),  the  reduction of  total supply will be  of minor
importance.  Experience in the U.S.A.  and  the preliminary results of the
fallow scheme employed in Lower Saxony  (F.R.G.)  show that the  enrolled land
is  less productive and located in unfavorable areas.  Although short-term
market relief may be achieved to  some extent, these programs are very
expensive to  operate  in the  long run, especially if  they are not
accompanied by any reduction in the  level of price support.  They force a
gradual increase  in the quantity of land to be put  in set-aside in order to
compensate for ongoing  technical progress.  They also encourage  the  use of
special  "land-saving" technologies due to  a rise  in the opportunity costs
of land compared to other factor prices.  This  could cause a further
increase in the intensity of  land use with quite obvious effects on the
overall level of production  (de Haen and Thoroe,  1987;  Henze, 1985;
Boeckenhoff, et al.,  1985;  Schmitt and Thoroe, 1986).
The compensatory allowances  granted to farmers  in less  favored areas
have an effect on the  overall  level of agricultural output,  too.  The
scheme currently implemented includes  a benefit ceiling  (see Table 1) which
15encourages  farmers  to  complete their resources,  e.g.,  a certain number of
livestock units,  in order  to  claim the maximum amount of benefits.
Principally, these benefits  strengthen the competitiveness  of farm holdings
in areas which normally have to  close down farming.  On the other hand,
they might help to  reduce regional  imbalances which are regarded as  an
important objective of regional policy.
Roughly the  same  effects will be  caused by  income  transfers which are
related  to  fixed factors  such as  land.  They act like  a reduction of  fixed
costs.  The  long-term lowest price  limit will drop  and farm holdings will
remain competitive because of a lowered break-even point, even when  there
is  a substantial reduction in the  level of price support.  If.the  amount of
benefit is proportional  to  the  total  area of agricultural land utilized
(the PBS-  and PNT-Schemes),  the  "disparity" between different sizes  and
types  of farm holdings will be aggravated.  In the  long-run, transfer
payments related to  fixed factors  are not production-neutral since they
will influence the  total number of farms maintaining agricultural
production.
Retirement schemes,  like the  SSR[3]-  and MRP-Schemes, are  de  facto
limited to  small-sized farmers;  they provide a basic payment which  implies
a declining amount of benefits per unit,  e.g.,  hectare of agricultural area
set-aside.  In case participants are  forced to  set aside,  to  reforest or to
leave  fallow land, there might be  a small reduction in total supply. 3
3If the MRP-Scheme, as proposed by the Federal Ministry of
Agriculture,  is applied throughout  the EEC and if approximately 8.5 percent
of all farm holdings participate, the estimated effect on reduction of
agricultural output during a 5-year period will amount to  10  million tons
of cereals  and 6.6 million tons  of milk  (about 6.5 percent of total grain
[milk]  production in 1985-86 within the  EEC);  see Buehner and Gocht (1987).
16However, total agricultural output would probably remain unchanged if  land
could be  leased  to other  "viable"  farms.
Only minor  impact on total  supply will be caused by transfer schemes
providing payments  to  farm households  in order to maintain a certain level
of income  or  to  improve  the  level  of disposable  income  (SSR, 2).4
Possibly the  strongest effect in  the  long run will be caused by applying
the MIG-Scheme, since  income  transfers are  only available  to  farm
households below a certain minimum income level.  Incentives  on production
are very unlikely because  all  farms are confronted with successively
reduced price support;  this will certainly lead to  long-term reductions  in
total supply.  The proportion of  low income farms will  depend on the  amount
and period of reducing  the level  of price  support, the mobility of labor,
and off-farm job opportunities.
Changes  in the  structure of total agricultural supply caused by the
introduction of a system of direct income  transfer payments are difficult
to predict.  In cases where transfer payments are linked  to  the area of
agricultural land utilized, they will raise the  relative competitiveness of
the branches  of agricultural production requiring land  (PBS,  PNT Schemes).
Roughly the  same applies to  transfer payments related to  total  marketable
crops  (DCP System).
Level and structure of  factor input.  Almost all  schemes documented in
Table  2 rely on successive reductions  of product prices as  a complementary
measure.  Generally, product price reductions  tend to  lower the value
marginal product of a specific  factor and consequently total factor input.
4The membership rate exemptions  for  the  social  security system
provided for low income  farm households  could also be subsumed into  this
category of transfer schemes.
17Whether price reductions  cause reductions  of factor input remains one of
the undecided problems within the  "scientific community of.agricultural
economists."  Many agricultural economists  argue  that compensation payments
may influence labor supply and investment decisions and evoke
counterproductive, reallocative effects  (see Hanf and Koester, 1980,  p.
122-150;  Hansmeyer, 1963, p. 48).
Using the  traditional static labor-leisure/income model, Figure  2
illustrates  the work-leisure decisions of farm households entitled to
transfer payments, according to  the MRP Scheme.  Farmers 55 years  of age,
who close-down farming completely for at  least  10 years, can claim an
additional  unearned income.  The  total amount of  transfer payments NSMP
consists  of:
1.  The  retirement benefit  (basic payment)  LAG,
2.  Refunded membership fees  to  the  agricultural security system
(LSV),  and
3.  An average premium varying according to  land productivity and
area of agricultural  land utilized (FZ).
Figure 2(a) depicts  the decision of a farm household using Hl hours,
out of a total of T hours available for work and/or leisure,  for on-farm
work.  The additional unearned income provided by the MRP Scheme must
exceed NlSMp to make  the  farm household better off  (as indicated by the
indifference curve I1).  If the amount of benefits equals just N1SMP,  the
farm household is  obviously indifferent about continuing or  closing down
farming.
Figure 2(b)  focuses on  the off-farm labor decision of a farm household
already participating in the program.  Earned income resulting from off-
farm work (Ha)  will reduce transfer payments if  the  amount of income  is
double the  LAG basic payment.  This specific design of the  transfer scheme
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will result  in a kinked budget line.  According to Figure  2, the
indifference  curve I 1 illustrates  the best attainable utility level of a
farm household starting or continuing off-farm employment  (for further
details see Gebauer, 1988,  pp. 49-51).
Empirical evidence on the problem of  "biased"  investment decisions by
farm households because  of transfer payments  is  provided in a recent study.
It shows significant differences,  in the  structure and amount of capital
investments, between farms  in less  favored areas claiming compensatory
allowances and those farms  which do not claim such allowances  (see Klaiber,
1987).  Capital  investment decisions might also be  influenced by income
19aids  provided according to  the  SSR proposals.  Generally speaking, the more
farm households/farm holdings are entitled to  transfer payments--and the
higher the benefit per recipient--and the greater the  income  loss being
(over)-compensated, the  less  impact  there  is  on factor mobility.  Therefore
again, the most serious effect on the  reduction of total factor  input  in
agriculture will probably be  attained by implementing the MIG Scheme.5
Transfer schemes providing benefits which are related to  the  total
area of agricultural land  (PBS and PNT Schemes,  compensatory payments  to
less-favored areas)  tend to keep more  land in agricultural production than
otherwise.  The  opposite effect will be  attained by set-aside programs
which primarily produce short-term ma.-ket  relief.  In the long run,
however,  it  is  far more  sensible to  reduce total  labor input rather  than
the  input of  land.6 The  incentives provided by retirement schemes  (NRS;
SSR3b) with no or minor stipulations on land use  turn out  to be  the  most
efficient in the long run regarding the  level and structure  of factor
input.
These comments are  directly linked to  the  impacts on structural
change and adjustment.  The  effects  on structural change,  according to  the
5Income  transfer schemes  intending a full compensation of  income
losses will result  in an over-compensation of  income  losses very quickly if
they do not take into account  the reallocation of factors  and adjustment
processes within an individual  farm holding.  In  the  long run one-quarter
to one-third of  the original  income  losses will be  compensated by these
adjustment processes  (see Hanf and Koester,  1980, pp.  104-105).
6"General considerations  on resource allocation lead to the conclusion
that it would be advantageous  to reduce  the  input of  those production
factors which can be profitably transferred to other sectors  of the
economy.  Among the agricultural production factors  these are mainly
industrial  intermediate inputs, capital and  those members of the  labor
force which have alternative employment opportunities"  (Henrichsmeyer and
Ostermeyer-Schloeder, 1987).
20schemes proposed by the Atlantic Institute, Koester and Tangermann, and
v.Riemsdijk--sometimes designated as  "personal  income transfer"  schemes--
depend upon:  the  reduction of  farm holdings during the period of validity
(15-20 years),  the number of farms realizing the  opportunity of
capitalizing the benefits,  and the current relation between farms  entitled
to benefits  and farm holdings not entitled to benefits.  The recipient
ceiling scheduled by the  transfer  systems will  create sharp distinctions
between farms with respect to  their capability for capital  investments,  and
buying or  leasing land  (Henrichsmeyer, et al.,  1981,  p. 25).
Structural change will probably be delayed by  introducing income  aids
according to  the proposals made by the EC Commission;  the  same holds true
for  the payments  available to  small-sized farm holdings to  lower  the
membership rates  to  the social security system.
The  retirement scheme  (NRS) and  the MIG program might provide  fairly
strong incentives  for structural adjustment while the MRP Scheme would
probably retard structural change due  to land being diverted to non-
agricultural uses  for a 10-year-period (Hagedorn and Klare,  1987).  This
may lead to  an increase  in land prices and rents  and impede  the growth
process  of individual  farms.
Effects  caused by transfer payments proportional to  the area of
agricultural land will be ambiguous;  likewise, if there  is  no benefit
ceiling and/or a digressive transfer formula, intrasectoral disparities
(PNT Scheme) will be aggravated.  However, restricting the entitlement to
benefits  to  farm holdings  in less  favored areas,  the  process of an optimal
interregional allocation of resources will slow down.
214.2.2  Distributional effects
One of the principal aims of direct  income  transfer payments  is  to
maintain  (or to  improve) the  level of disposable  income of  low-income farm
households.  Nevertheless, most  of the  transfer schemes currently
implemented or proposed do not  refer  to  the personal  income  position  (e.g.,
total  income of  the household),  rather they are linked to  total
agricultural output or  to  factor input.  Thus, most of  the  schemes  affect
the  level and distribution of personal  income indirectly via changes  in  the
structure of  factor ownership and level of functional  income.
Functional  income distribution.  Transfer payments  directly related to
a specific factor tend  to be capitalized in this  factor and to  increase  its
price.  (These effects, especially  in the case of agricultural land, will
be partly offset by a reduction of product price support which will result
in a decrease of land prices and affect the  distribution of wealth.)  The
most evident impact on functional  incomes will be caused by transfer
schemes related to  the area of agricultural  land being utilized.  Transfer
payments  related to  input of  land will certainly raise  the price  for buying
or leasing land  (PBS, PNT Schemes);  see  also Ruttan (1986)  and Runge and
Halbach  (1987).
Set-aside  schemes and retirement programs  (for any non-agricultural
use of the  land released) might also cause an increase  in the price of farm
land remaining  in agricultural production, while  the market value of the
diverted land may decline, causing a reduction in both the value of  assets
and credit lines  (de Haen and Thoroe, 1987).  These schemes will make  farm
growth more difficult and will result in an impediment to  further
structural change.  Especially under  the prevailing conditions  in Germany,
22land is  a scarce resource with high marginal productivity for agricultural
use  and fairly limited opportunities for other uses.  Therefore, set-aside
schemes tend to  raise the  costs  of agricultural production and delay
structural adjustments  (de Haen and Thoroe,  1987).
The  level  and distribution of personal  income remain largely
unchanged if the  amount of benefits  is  of minor importance compared to  the
total household income.  Therefore,  the  income aids  provided according to
the  proposals of  the EC  Commission as well  as  the membership rate
exemptions will have  little  impact on personal income  distribution.
Fairly strong impacts  on personal and intrasectoral  income  distribution
will be caused by applying the  CP-,  PIT-,  and DCP-System.  This  is  because
of  a recipient's ceiling which creates a sharp distinction between the
group of households depending solely on  income from agricultural  activities
and the group claiming additional  benefits.  Further, within these schemes
an overcompensation of  income  losses  is very likely if  the  transfer rate  is
not corrected according to  adjustment capabilities which vary
significantly between different farm sizes.  Therefore, these  schemes might
aggravate intra-sectoral  income disparities.
The MIG Scheme, which is  designed like  a negative  income tax system
(see OECD, 1974),  will reduce income  differences and  improve the  income
position of farm households with low or even negative  income from
agriculture.  An improvement  in the  income position of small-sized farmers
might also be achieved by applying the NRS or the MRP Scheme.  The MRP
Scheme schedules a basic payment;  additional  transfers  are related to
total  area of agricultural  land set-aside.  This transfer formula  implies a
regressive  tariff in the way that the average payment per unit  (e.g.,  land)
23will decline with an increase  in the  amount of land diverted to non-
agricultural uses. 7
4.2.3  Budgetary aspects
With regard to  the  tremendous  increase  in Community budget costs,  the
financial  impact of reform proposals  attracts a lot of  attention.  Interest
concentrates mainly on  (a)  whether direct  income  transfer payments
(sometimes virtually  independent of  the design of the specific scheme)  will
significantly reduce the  financial burden and,  (b)  whether direct  income
transfer payments will  improve overall national welfare and gross  national
product.
Principally, the switch from the present system of price support to
one of direct income  transfer payments  largely corresponds to  a
substitution of private expenditures  (via high consumer prices)  for public
expenditures.  The budget expenditures currently used for storage, export
subsidies, and the inferior use of  (surplus) products will be reduced if
overall agricultural production declines.  By substituting private  for
public expenditures,  the gross national product will remain unchanged;
income  distribution, however, might change due to  a reduction of consumer
prices and the  type of financing adopted for direct transfer payments to
farmers.
The financing plans  proposed by the authors  of the  schemes depicted in
Table 2 rely mainly on an increase  in direct taxes.  An increase in
7Referring to  the distributional consequences of  the MRP Scheme,
Henze and Zeddies  (1987)  state that "on average about  twice as much  is  paid
in incentives  than would be necessary to make up  for income losses....  The
participating farmers are  able  to double  their income."
24indirect  taxes  (CP, DCP, and PIT Schemes) would result  in an additional
burden on low  income groups  and possibly provide negative effects on the
demand for food  (see also Runge and Halbach, 1987).  When financing direct
income transfer payments by public households,  the amount of transfers paid
to  farm households will be  influenced by overall economic factors  (cyclical
movements) as  well.
Apart from the  discussion on financing,  the  total budget effects  of
the  schemes proposed attract a fair  amount of attention at present.  The
transfer payment schemes proposed in the  70s account for rather small
reductions  of the national budget or the  Community budget  (EAGGF)
expenditures.  The data used, however, are based on past conditions of
agricultural markets, prices, agricultural and non-agricultural  general
settings,  etc.,  which have  in the meantime completely changed.  For this
reason it  is not very sensible  to repeat  the calculations  in detail,
particularly, since most of  the authors point out that the  data are partly
unsettled and based largely on assumptions.  In this context just one
study should be cited.  Dicke and Rodemer  (1982) proposed a system of
direct income  transfers which differs  from other proposals with respect  to
the immediate and overall removal of current price  support and related
measures within the EEC.8 In case farmers  are  fully compensated for income
losses  (total producer's surplus) budget relief (on balance) during  the
first year will amount to  6.35 billion DM (10 percent reduction of product
prices);  however, budget costs will increase  (on balance) by about 35.2
billion DM if producer prices go  lower than about 30 percent  (the
8Therefore, the  scheme is  fairly similar to  the CP,  the DCP,  and PIT
Schemes and is not included in Table  2;  entitlement to  transfer payments
is  also restricted to  the present generation of farmers.
25calculations  refer to  1977-78).  Budget reliefs increase  significantly
after completing the  adjustment process  (after one decade).  Calculations
referring to  the budget effects  of direct income  transfer payment  schemes,
which are relevant at present, refer mostly to  retirement-  and set-aside
schemes.  They  focus primarily on a comparison between the  total amount of
transfers paid and the  decline of budget costs due  to a reduction in total
agricultural output  (Buehner and Gocht,  1987;  EC Commission, 1987;  Wolffram
and Hoff, 1987).  These  calculations do not refer  to real cost-benefit
analyses and, therefore, might lead to  incorrect conclusions  about the
efficiency of these programs.
Table  3 presents a comparison between the  estimated budget costs  and
reliefs  of  the MRP and the  SSR Scheme.  The data on the  estimated budget
Table 3.  Estimated Budget Costs  and Reliefs of Set-aside Schemes.
Scheme  Land  Participation  Budget  Expenditures I  Budget  Reliefs
_l____ _(during the  first 5 years)
Farmers  (in %)  Agr.  area'  total  DM  per  total  DM  per
(billion DM)  hectare  (billion DM)  I  hectare
MRP  FRG  61000  (8.5)  88000  1.1  1250  1.9  2160
EC-10  447000  (8.5)  7490000  9.4  1260
SSR-3a  EC-lO  40000  480000  1.213  2530 3 1.569  43602
SSR-3b  EC-10  66000  - 0.734  n.a.
IAgricultural  area  diverted  to non-agricultural  uses:  2 75%  of total  area  set-aside:
3 including benefits  for  afforested  areas;
( 1  ECU  =  2.06  DM  )
Source:  Buhner/Gocht  (1987);  EC  Commission  (1987).
26costs  and reliefs per hectare of agricultural land diverted to  non-
agricultural use, reveals  the huge  range  of these  estimates.  However, the
relation between budget costs  and reliefs  remains constant.  The  assumed
participation rates also vary significantly.9 Short-term considerations of
1 to  5 years suggest  that the  total reduction of Community expenditure
exceeds  the  total  costs  of the  schemes.  Long-term considerations may lead
to  another conclusion, however, since  technical progress will  cause  further
increases both in  the  size/extent of agricultural  areas diverted to non-
agricultural use and in the amount of transfer  payments required  to
mobilize these areas.  Boeckenhoff, et al.  (1985, p. 181)  also provide
figures  on the expenditures needed to  reduce  input of arable  land by 13.5
percent  (about 6.6 million hectares within the EEC)  in order to  achieve a
reduction in total grain production of about 20  million tons.  If current
price levels  for cereals did not change,  and mainly marginal areas were
put to  set aside,  and any over-compensation of income losses were
excluded, then the short-term (long-term) budget expenditures per  100 kg of
grain would amount to  about DM 20  (DM 12)  plus administrative costs and
additional expenditures  for  the maintenance of these  areas.  These
expenditures have  to be balanced with terms  of trade effects  resulting from
a reduction in the  quantity of grain which would have been exported  (about
9Generally, participation rates  (the acceptance of the  transfer
schemes)  will depend on the design of the  transfer scheme, the  transfer
formula, and the criteria set up for eligibility.  According to  the
criteria set up within the MRP Scheme, approximately 8-10 percent  of the
total  agricultural area will be  set aside  in  the Federal Republic of
Germany on the assumption farmers behave "economically rational."  For
details,  see Bremer, et  al.  (1987).  Participation rates tend  to be higher
if there are  no  stipulations on land use  (see Wilstacke, 1985,  1987).
274 billion DM).1 0 Set-aside schemes,  therefore, account  for relatively
small budget reliefs per hectare of agricultural  area diverted to non-
agricultural use mainly because  they do not provide any  incentives to
reduce milk and beef production.  These products cause  significantly
higher budget expenditures, as  in  the case of  the MRP and SSR-3 Scheme,
which  is  the  main reason why budget reliefs,  when calcultated on a per
hectare basis,  largely exceed budget costs.
Hagedorn and Klare  (1986) who proposed the NRS  Scheme assume that
between the years  1986 and 2015, approximately 100,000 farmers will  apply
for the pre-retirement benefit.  The estimated costs vary according to  the
number of applicants  per year  (age structure) and will account  for  100  to
500 million DM per year.
The data provided in this  section reflects  the difficulties in making
any serious predictions concerning  the financial  impact of  the  schemes
proposed.  Effects on total budget costs remain unpredictable, especially,
if the  level of price support is not lowered significantly and income
transfer payments are not restricted to  low income groups.
4.2.4  Environmental protection
There is no doubt  that high and stable  producer prices within the  EEC
have  initiated and encouraged a significant  intensification and
specialization of agricultural production systems.  With highly
intensified agricultural production, environmental damage  (e.g.,  the
contamination of groundwater resources)  and changes  in the structure of
10In comparison to  short- and long-term expenditures, export subsidies
amount to approximately DM 15 per  100 kg.
28land use occur  to an increasing extent.  On the  other hand, ecological
risks and damage are sometimes of minor importance  in areas with low land
productivity.  The maintenance of agricultural production within these
areas  depends very much on the level of price support.  Reform proposals
which rely on lowered price support, therefore, will strongly affect the
continuation of farming  in these  areas.  Roughly  the same effect  applies  in
the case of set-aside schemes providing incentives  in the  form of  a uniform
premium, fixed at a low or medium level.  As a consequence, land diverted
to  non-agricultural use will concentrate  on areas with low land
productivity;  this might-contradict  regional and ecological  policy aims.
The  ecological incidence  of set-aside programs could be  increased if
transfer rates varied according to  land productivity or by leaving the
determination of region specific  premiums to public  tenders. 1
Set-aside schemes, as  already mentioned in section 4.2.1, might
affect the intensity of the use of the remaining agricultural areas  (e.g.,
land drainage,  land consolidation or removal  of hedges).  Further,  they
might encourage the expansion of livestock production on the remaining
areas which will aggravate the problem of disposal of liquid manure and
groundwater contamination.  From  this discussion it  is  quite obvious that
set-aside schemes, although motivated with environmental policy
objectives, are not qualified to pursue  these aims very efficiently.
All the other schemes depicted in Table 2 do not provide  any
determined or goal-directed effects on environmental protection;  they haye
11Compared to a uniform premium, such tenders  (bidding procedures)
would, at least theoretically, avoid ineffective producer rents  for
farmers whose income  losses  from putting land to  set-aside are smaller
than the benefits  received (de Haen and Thoroe, 1987).
29to be  supplemented by specific measures  of environmental protection in
certain regions  in order to  remove or avoid environmental damage, maintain
a devised structure of land use  or a specific form of the landscape.  Just
as  obvious  is  the  fact that general compensatory payments to  farms  in  less
favored areas, without any stipulations on land use or the  type  of
(animal) production, and even without any precise definition of  the
farmer's  contribution  to environmental protection, will contribute  little
to  the above-mentioned objectives  (see Peters,  1980;  Langendorf,  1985).
4.2.5  Conformity and administrative problems
Conformity.  All  reform proposals have  to consider problems  of
compatibility and conformity with respect to  the basic  objectives and
principles of the  CAP according to  the Treaty of Rome  (1957) and to
national agricultural acts.  Principally, a system of direct income
transfers with no or minor restrictions concerning entitlement to benefits
might be  inconsistent with universal  ideas on justice  and efficiency in
free-market economies,  and hard to  justify in a global reference  to any
"fundamental" change  in agricultural policy orientation.
Apart  from this  general problem, the  income objectives  set up  for  the
farm population by means of specific agricultural acts might come into
conflict with the distributional consequences of  the schemes proposed.
This holds true in the  case of the MIG scheme;  its application requires  a
redefinition of income  objectives first.  Further, direct transfer payments
provided solely by individual member states  contradict articles 92  and 94
of the Treaty of Rome.  Although there  are a lot  of exceptions  (special
regulations) pushed through by individual member states in the past, the
30EC Commission tries  to  set up common guidelines  and regulations  (SSR-2
proposals  of the Commission, 1987)  for  income aids  financed by individual
member states.  These  guidelines are primarily intended to avoid
infringements  of the  Commission's competence  in organizing the CAP  and in
the "re-nationalization" of the  so-called common agricultural policy.
Administration.  Most of the  reform proposals do not provide  any
indication or even solution to  the administrative and controlling problems.
Benefit payments  related to  the  area of  agricultural land utilized require
an exact registration of farm land first;  this could prove  to be a
difficult undertaking especially in  the  southern regions of the  EEC,  and in
areas which could be  used both as  grass  and arable  land.  Set-aside and
fallow schemes which cover only certain parts of an  individual holding
evoke enormous problems  in supervising whether individual  farmers will keep
contracts and regulations.  Set-aside  or fallow schemes  (according to  the
SSR-3  and MRP proposals) which enforce the entire cessation of farming will
largely alleviate  these problems.
Transfer payment schemes which attempt to compensate  farms  for income
losses due  to  the reduction of product prices  (CP, DCP,  and PIT Schemes),
referring to total output during a base period, require efficient methods
for calculating the amount of benefits  (see Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim
BMELF,  1982, p. 27).  This could be done using.the  concept of
"standardized farm income",1 2 although the imputed income capacity
frequently will be over- or under-estimated especially in the  case of
big/small farm holdings.  The  accuracy of these  calculations,  if they
12The "standardized farm income"  is an imputed income which refers  to
the current factor endowment of the farm holding.  Total income capacity is
calculated using figures  on average farm productivity and variable costs.
31refer to  an imputed farm profit, could be  improved by using individual
data on the  amount of fixed costs.
Income-tested transfer schemes refer to both farm and nonfarm income
sources.  However, quite a number of  schemes do not  include  unearned
income  (e.g.,  interests,  rents) or refer  to  the  income of  the  farm operator
couple rather  than to  the  income of the  farm household as  a whole.
The problems  of calculating the benefits will be  aggravated if
transfer payments are related to  total  family farm labor  input and compared
to  an average  level  of regional or national  income per working unit or
persons being gainfully employed  (according to  the  SSR proposals by the  EC
Commission, 1987).  In that case,  income-tested transfer programs will
require efficient procedures  to assess  entitlement to  transfer payments  and
to  calculate the  amount of benefits.  Basically, farm households claiming
benefits should give proof of their  eligibility.
In case  entitlement to benefits  is restricted to farm households with
an  income below a certain minimum income  level  (MIG Scheme),  the
stigmatization problem, possible negative social-psychological consequences
for recipients, should be taken  into account  (see Rainwater, 1982).  Apart
from this problem, which might account for the most serious one, the
problem of  (non-)inclusion and valuation of assets  (farm land) must be
considered as  well.  The MIG Scheme, as  proposed by Schmitt and von Witzke
(1980),  allows  for the deduction of assets below a certain limit, otherwise
farmers would be  forced to sell farm assets  in order to be entitled to
transfer payments.
In the Federal Republic of Germany the  share  of farm households with
an income below a threshold, according to  social welfare  aid, amounts to
32approximately 8 percent (1978-79).  This share  declines  drastically if
computations account for annual fluctuations  of farm income  and any  (at
least partial) realization of farm assets  (for details  see  Plankl,  1986).
On the other hand, the higher the exemptions  on assets  the smaller the
impacts  on factor  (farm land) mobility.  Therefore,  the MIG Scheme, as
proposed by Hagedorn and Klare  (1986),  should be combined with a retirement
scheme, and tax privileges  for  farm land should be removed.  However,
implementing the MIG Scheme  requires  a co-ordination of  taxation and  social
welfare policies  as well.
Applying a system of direct  income  transfer payments throughout  the
EEC causes additional problems.  The heterogeneity of national economies
with respect  to varying productive capacities,  differences  in the  structure
of the farm and nonfarm sectors, rates  of inflation, levels  of agricultural
prices, and varying evaluations  of farm policy objectives  do not give  rise
to any optimistic prediction concerning the  "quality" of decisions  obtained
within the  institutional framework of the  EEC  (Schmitt, 1978;
Henrichsmeyer,  et al.,  1981, p. 21).  Furthermore,  international income
transfers caused by  the Community's  financial  responsibility have to be
taken into account as  well.  Financing direct income  transfers by the
Community Budget (EAGGF) might end up with consumers and taxpayers in  low
income countries being enlisted to co-finance the  income  transfers  to
farmers in high-income member states  (Thoroe, 1980).
The discussion already reveals  that there  is  in fact no real chance  to
introduce a "system" of direct income  transfers at the  EC  level.
Therefore, the scope of application, the design of the  transfer  scheme,
especially the amount of transfers paid, should be  left  to national
33responsibility;  the  Community's  financial contribution should be restricted
to  a basic payment taking differences  in economic welfare  into account.
5.  Summary and Policy Implications
This paper presents  some  reflections  on direct income  transfers  as  a
means  for  improving the  income position of low income  farm households and
on dissolving the connection between the  level of price support and the
production incentive, which  leads  to a large number of  serious problems
within the  agricultural sectors  of almost all developed countries.  Direct
income  transfer payments  already account for an increasing amount  of total
income  support being made available  to  farm households.  These transfer
payments result  from various  (however, incoherent) schemes  and programs
and encompass a wide range of different aims.  The programs currently
implemented are mainly intended to  supplement present price support policy
and  to correct  for unintentional consequences of  the CAP.
Apart from the programs currently applied, there  are quite a number of
reform proposals based on the  idea of substituting the system of price
support for a system of direct  income transfers.  The paper discusses  the
implications of these programs with respect to  the allocation of resources
in agricultural production, the  level and distribution of income, budgetary
aspects, environmental impacts,  and administrative problems.  As  the
discussion reveals most transfer schemes are not qualified to  tackle  the
most relevant and urgent problems of  the CAP  in a very efficient or
convincing way without creating new distortions.  This  is mainly due  to  the
fact that they do not completely account for  the  long-term consequences of
the  structural adjustment process  in agriculture.  They may even contribute
34to  the prolongation of current problems.  Moreover, reflecting on the
institutional setting of the  CAP and the wide  range of objectives pursued
by different member states,  there  is  a priori very little chance of a
successful implementation of  these policy concepts.
The present situation  in the  EEC favors  short-term solutions  (e.g.,
set-aside schemes)  to  alleviate  the most urgent problems;  long-term
considerations, however, should reflect  the basic principles of a socially
founded free-market economy and should provide  subsidiary income  support
to  farm households to  ensure a minimum standard of  living according to
criteria which apply to  other social groups  as  well.
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